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Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents

Claude Crampes () and Corinne Langinier ()

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We show that there exists no separating equilibrium because the incumbent of a high-valued market always has some incentive to mimic the behavior of a firm in a bad market. Consequently, we find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.

Keywords: INFORMATION; MONOPOLIES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents (2000)
Journal Article: Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent (1998) Downloads
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