Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire

Dominique Lepelley and Vincent Merlin ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 51, 29-48

Abstract: A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule violates the majority principle as defined by Condorcet. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. Some weakened versions of Condorcet principle are introduced and we characterize those scoring rules which fulfill these conditions. Moreover, we evaluate the propensity of some scoring rules to violate these majority conditions.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:29-48

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