Details about Dominique Lepelley

Workplace:

Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien (CEMOI) (Center for the Economics and the Management of the Indian Ocean), Faculté de Droit et de Sciences Économiques et Politiques (Faculty of Law, Economics and Politics), Université de la Réunion (University of Reunion), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Dominique Lepelley.

Last updated 2022-10-01. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ple690

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Working Papers

2021

1. Coalitional manipulability of three scale evaluative voting: Quantification and comparison with three other voting rules
   (Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux: Quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote)
   Post-Print, HAL
2. Remarques sur le mode d'élection des conseillers départementaux
   Post-Print, HAL

2020

3. L'évolution du pouvoir de vote des communes au sein des communautés d'agglomération de La Réunion
   Post-Print, HAL
4. On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article in Annals of Operations Research (2020)
5. Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (9)
   See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2020)
6. The Theoretical Shapley-Shubik Probability of an Election Inversion in a Toy Symmetric Version of the U.S. Presidential Electoral System
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2018) View citations (5)
   IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) (2018) View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2020)

2019

7. Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article in Group Decision and Negotiation (2019)
8. Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2019)

2018

9. Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective
   TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) View citations (2)
   Also in IAST Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) (2018) View citations (1)
10. Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (12)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2018)

2017

11. Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (49)
    See also Book (2017)
12. Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in Working Papers, HAL (2016)
    TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2016)
    See also Journal Article in L'Actualité Economique (2017)
13. Le Scrutin Binominal Paritaire: Un Regard d'Ingénierie Electorale
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
    Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2017) View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article in Revue économique (2017)
14. The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting
    TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2017)

2016

15. A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (9)
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2016)
16. Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (9)
    See also Journal Article in Economics Bulletin (2016)
17. Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule
    TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) View citations (14)
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2016) View citations (12)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2016)
18. Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Group Decision and Negotiation (2016)
19. Introduction
    Post-Print, HAL
20. Partage d'un cours d'eau international: l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 1)
    Post-Print, HAL
21. Partage d'un cours d'eau international: l'apport de la théories des jeux coopératifs (Partie 2)
    Post-Print, HAL
22. The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology (2017)
23. To Rank or Not to Rank: A Summary
    Working Papers, HAL

2015

24. Refining measures of group mutual coherence
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (3)
25. Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
26. Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (22)
    See also Journal Article in Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology (2015)

2014

27. Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Revue d'économie politique (2013)
28. Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article in Economics Bulletin (2014)
29. The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Group Decision and Negotiation (2015)
30. The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: From IC to IAC trhough Ehrhart's Polynomials and Strong Mixing
    TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
    Also in IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2012)
31. Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (4)
    Also in IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2012)
    TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2012) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Revue économique (2014)

2013

32. Book review: Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010
    Post-Print, HAL
33. Introduction à la théorie des jeux (1): jeux non coopératifs
    Post-Print, HAL
34. Introduction à la théorie des jeux (2): jeux coopératifs
    Post-Print, HAL
35. Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (Eds.): Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer, 2010
    Post-Print, HAL
36. The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2013)

2012

37. Choix collectif et procédures de votes
    Post-Print, HAL
38. Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2011)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2012)
39. Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2013)
40. On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    Also in THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (2011) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2013)
41. The Condorcet ranking efficiency of voting rules
    Post-Print, HAL
42. The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
    See also Chapter (2012)

2011

43. Analyse économique du règlement sportif de la coupe du monde de football
    Post-Print, HAL
44. Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Annals of Economics and Statistics (2011)
45. The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article in Annals of Economics and Statistics (2011)
46. Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (15)
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (2011)
47. Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (20)

2010

48. La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale
    Post-Print, HAL
    Also in Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) (2009) View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article in Recherches économiques de Louvain (2009)
49. Modeling crop-livestock integration systems on a regional scale in Reunion Island: sugar cane and dairy cow activities
    Post-Print, HAL

2009

50. A note on Condorcet's other paradox
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Economics Bulletin (2009)
51. On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2010)
52. On the probability to act in the european union
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    See also Chapter (2009)

2008

53. Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)
54. The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2009)

2007

55. On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
    Also in Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS (2006) View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2008)
56. On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of its Members
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (10)
    Also in Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS (2006) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2007)
57. Voter équitable dans l'Europe à 27
    Post-Print, HAL

2006

58. Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (29)
    See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2006)

2004

59. La détermination du nombre de délégués au sein des structures intercommunales: une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (2)
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article in Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine (2004)
60. More on Statistical Manipulability of Social Choice Functions
    Post-Print, HAL
61. The Probability of Conflicts in a U.S. Presidential Type Election
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (3)
    Also in Post-Print, HAL (2004) View citations (17)
    See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2004)

2003

62. La mesure du pouvoir de vote
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (23)
63. On some limitations of the median voting rule
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (9)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2003)
64. The measurement of voting power
    (La mesure du pouvoir de vote)
    Post-Print, HAL
65. Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (26)
    See also Journal Article in Public Choice (2003)

2002

66. Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (31)

1996

67. The likehood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
    Post-Print, HAL
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1996)

Journal Articles

2022

1. Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences
   SN Business & Economics, 2022, 2, (8), 1-22

2021

2. Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games
   Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, 30, (1), 43-61
3. Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux: quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote
   Revue d'économie politique, 2021, 131, (2), 297-321

2020

4. On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences
   Annals of Operations Research, 2020, 289, (2), 227-241 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper (2020)
5. Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
   Theory and Decision, 2020, 88, (2), 205-229 View citations (9)
   See also Working Paper (2020)
6. The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 54, (2), 363-395 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper (2020)

2019

7. Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules
   Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, 28, (4), 787-804 View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper (2019)
8. Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective
   Public Choice, 2019, 179, (1), 51-95 View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper (2019)

2018

9. An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures
   Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2018, 35, (1), 53-79 View citations (4)
10. Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, 50, (1), 1-33 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper (2018)

2017

11. Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral
    L'Actualité Economique, 2017, 93, (1-2), 203-248
    See also Working Paper (2017)
12. Le scrutin binominal paritaire: un regard d’ingénierie électorale
    Revue économique, 2017, 68, (6), 965-1004 View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2017)
13. The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference
    Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2017, 51, (6), 2793-2812
    See also Working Paper (2016)
14. The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, 49, (2), 315-327
    See also Working Paper (2017)

2016

15. A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 80, (C), 115-122 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper (2016)
16. Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections
    Economics Bulletin, 2016, 36, (3), 1722-1728 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper (2016)
17. Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, 64, (C), 11-22 View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper (2016)
18. Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2016, 25, (5), 941-966 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2016)

2015

19. The Condorcet Efficiency Advantage that Voter Indifference Gives to Approval Voting Over Some Other Voting Rules
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, 24, (2), 243-269 View citations (13)
    See also Working Paper (2014)
20. Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox
    Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2015, 49, (6), 2345-2368 View citations (27)
    See also Working Paper (2015)

2014

21. Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case
    Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34, (4), 2201-2207 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2014)
22. Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820
    Revue économique, 2014, 65, (3), 469-518 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper (2014)

2013

23. Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.): Handbook on approval voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 40, (4), 1231-1235
    See also Working Paper (2012)
24. Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin
    Revue d'économie politique, 2013, 123, (6), 827-850 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2014)
25. On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (2), 263-279 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (2012)
26. The impact of voters’ preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2013, 66, (3), 352-365 View citations (8)
    See also Working Paper (2013)

2012

27. Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 253-257
    Also in Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, (101-102), 7-11 (2011)
    See also Working Paper (2012)

2011

28. Measurement of Voting Power: a Preliminary Analysis of an Historical French Electoral Episode Through Simulations
    Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, (101-102), 71-85 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2011)
29. The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise
    Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, (101-102), 107-125 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2011)
30. Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2011, 62, (1), 28-33 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper (2011)

2010

31. On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2010, 35, (1), 1-23 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper (2009)

2009

32. A note on Condorcet's other paradox
    Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29, (3), 2000-2007
    See also Working Paper (2009)
33. La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale
    Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2009, 75, (4), 503-516 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2010)
34. The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule
    Theory and Decision, 2009, 67, (3), 267-293 View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2008)

2008

35. Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman, A.A.J. Marley, and Ilia M. Tsetlin: Behavioral social choice. Probabilistic models, statistical inference and applications
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 31, (2), 351-355 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2008)
36. On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 30, (3), 363-383 View citations (80)
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2007

37. On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, (2), 181-207 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2006

38. Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 26, (3), 485-509 View citations (33)
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2004

39. La détermination du nombre des délégués au sein des structures intercommunales: une application de l'indice de pouvoir de Banzhaf
    Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2004, avril, (2), 259-281 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper (2004)
40. The probability of conflicts in a U.S. presidential type election
    Economic Theory, 2004, 23, (2), 227-257 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper (2004)

2003

41. On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule
    Public Choice, 2003, 117, (1-2), 177-90 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper (2003)
42. Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity
    Public Choice, 2003, 116, (1-2), 165-84 View citations (23)
    See also Working Paper (2003)

2002

43. original papers: Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation
    Review of Economic Design, 2002, 7, (2), 213-228 View citations (23)

2001

44. Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings
    European Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 17, (1), 163-177 View citations (14)
45. The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2001, 41, (1), 39-50 View citations (13)

2000

46. Computer simulations of voting systems
    Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2000, 03, (01n04), 181-194 View citations (8)
47. Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
    Economic Theory, 2001, 17, (1), 53-80 View citations (8)
48. Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules
    Economics Letters, 2000, 68, (2), 157-164 View citations (1)
49. The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner
    Economics Letters, 2000, 66, (2), 191-197 View citations (4)

1999

50. A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner
    Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 1999, 33, (1), 85-96 View citations (1)
51. Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours
    Revue Économique, 1999, 50, (4), 699-714 View citations (1)
52. Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16, (3), 471-490 View citations (7)
53. On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 1999, 8, (2), 109-123 View citations (2)

1998

54. Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire
    Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, (51), 29-48 View citations (7)
55. The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998, 29, (3), 271-283 View citations (21)

1997

56. Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition
    Economics Letters, 1997, 55, (1), 85-89 View citations (3)
57. Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 1997, 6, (2), 119-138 View citations (1)

1996

58. Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (*)
    Economic Theory, 1996, 7, (3), 491-500 View citations (11)
59. The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1996, 31, (3), 133-146 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1994

60. Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences
    Review of Economic Design, 1994, 1, (1), 289-299 View citations (1)

1993

61. On the probability of electing the Condorcet
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993, 25, (2), 105-116 View citations (21)

1987

62. The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
    Economics Letters, 1987, 24, (4), 311-315 View citations (18)

Books

2017

1. Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes
   Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer View citations (49)
   See also Working Paper (2017)

2011

2. Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
   Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer View citations (74)

Chapters

2021

1. Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
   Springer
2. Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
   Springer

2017

3. Elections and Voting Paradoxes
   Springer
4. Measures of Agreement in Voters’ Preferences
   Springer
5. Other Voting Rules and Considerations
   Springer
6. Probabilities of Voting Paradoxes
   Springer
7. Single-Stage Election Procedures
   Springer
8. The Impact of Voter Indifference
   Springer
9. Two-Stage Election Procedures
   Springer View citations (3)

2012

10. The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules
    Springer
11. The Value of Research Based on Simple Assumptions about Voters’ Preferences
    Springer View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (2012)

2011

12. Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis
    Springer
13. Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies
    Springer
14. Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity
    Springer
15. Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence
    Springer
16. Other Characteristics of Voting Rules
    Springer
17. Other Incompatibility Paradoxes
    Springer
18. Other Voting Paradoxes
    Springer
19. The Significance of Voting Rule Selection
    Springer
20. Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities
    Springer View citations (1)

2009

21. On the Probability to Act in the European Union
    Springer View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2009)