Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the condorcet efficiency of voting rules

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]

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Keywords: Abstimmungsregel; Condorcet; Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat; marquis de; 1743-1794; Condorcet-Paradoxon; Game theory; Group theory; Kollektives Handeln; Mathematical models; Mathematisches Problem; Paradoxes; Theorie; Voting; Voting Mathematical models; Wahlverhalten (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Published in Springer, 2011, Studies in choice and welfare, 978-3-642-03106-9

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243452

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