EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.

Keywords: Elections; Election procedures; Social choice; Condorcet's Paradox; Voting paradox; Voting; Voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)

Published in Springer, pp.183, 2017, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 978-3-319-64659-6. ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Book: Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03571730

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03571730