On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule

William V Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Public Choice, 2003, vol. 117, issue 1-2, 177-90

Abstract: Median Voting Rule (MVR) has been proposed as a voting rule, based on the argument that MVR will be less manipulable than Borda Rule. We find that plurality rule has only a slightly greater probability of manipulability than MVR, and that Copeland Rule has a smaller probability of manipulability than MVR. In addition Borda Rule, plurality rule and Copeland Rule all have both a greater probability of producing a decisive result and a greater strict Condorcet efficiency than MVR. Based on all characteristics, MVR does not seem to be viable replacement for either plurality rule or for Copeland Rule. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: On some limitations of the median voting rule (2003)
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