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On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

Fabrice Barthélémy (), Dominique Lepelley and Mathieu Martin

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 41, issue 2, 263-279

Abstract: When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (2012)
Working Paper: On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games (2011) Downloads
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