On the Likelihood of Dummy players in Weighted Majority Games

Fabrice Barthélémy (), Dominique Lepelley and Mathieu Martin

No 2011-17, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; weighted voting games; dummy player; likelihood of voting paradoxes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (2013)
Working Paper: On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-17

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