Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules

Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou () and Hatem Smaoui ()
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Issofa Moyouwou: University of Yaounde I
Hatem Smaoui: Université de La Réunion

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 50, issue 1, No 1, 33 pages

Abstract: Abstract Scoring elimination rules (SER), that give points to candidates according to their rank in voters’ preference orders and eliminate the candidate(s) with the lowest number of points, constitute an important class of voting rules. This class of rules, that includes some famous voting methods such as Plurality Runoff or Coombs Rule, suffers from a severe pathology known as monotonicity paradox or monotonicity failure, that is, getting more points from voters can make a candidate a loser and getting fewer points can make a candidate a winner. In this paper, we study three-candidate elections and we identify, under various conditions, which SER minimizes the probability that a monotonicity paradox occurs. We also analyze some strategic aspects of these monotonicity failures. The probability model on which our results are based is the impartial anonymous culture condition, often used in this kind of study.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1069-1

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