Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin

Hatem Smaoui and Dominique Lepelley

Revue d'économie politique, 2013, vol. 123, issue 6, 827-850

Abstract: The purpose of this work is to explore the theoretical properties of the three-valued scale evaluative voting procedure. We confront this new election method, proposed by Felsenthal [1989] and Hillinger [2004a], with a set of normative criteria generally considered by voting theorists as ?desirable? conditions that guarantee the consistency and the relevancy of the collective choice. For this purpose, we adapt these conditions, traditionally defined in the context of ordinal preferences, to a formal framework more compatible with the notion of evaluative voting. The normative results we obtain are supplemented by a probabilistic analysis allowing to evaluate the Condorcet efficiency of the evaluative voting procedure.

Keywords: voting theory; preference aggregation; evaluative voting; Condorcet efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Le système de vote par note à trois niveaux: étude d'un nouveau mode de scrutin (2014)
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