Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections
Hatem Smaoui (),
Dominique Lepelley and
Issofa Moyouwou ()
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Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI University of La RÃ©union
Issofa Moyouwou: DÃ©partement de mathÃ©matiques - ENS - University of YaoundÃ© 1
Economics Bulletin, 2016, vol. 36, issue 3, 1722-1728
We derive analytical representations for the vulnerability of Borda Elimination Rule (BER) to Monotonicity Paradoxes. These results allow to compare BER vulnerability with that of Plurality Elimination Rule (or Plurality Runoff) and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule (or Coombs Rule), that suffer from the same pathologies. We show that BER performs better than these two rules at avoiding monotonicity failures. The probability model on which our results are based is the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition, often used in this kind of study.
Keywords: Group; decisions; -; Voting; rules; -; Scoring; Elimination; Rules; -; Monotonicity; failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Borda elimination rule and monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections (2016)
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