A note on Condorcet's other paradox

William v. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William v. Gehrlein: university of Delaware

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 3, 2000-2007

Abstract: We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.

Keywords: Social Choice; Voting paradoxes; Scoring rules; Majority rule; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-18
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Working Paper: A note on Condorcet's other paradox (2009)
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