A note on Condorcet's other paradox

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.

Keywords: Majority rule; Probability; Revue AERES; Scoring rules; Social Choice; Voting paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.2000--2007

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A note on Condorcet's other paradox (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243468

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().