Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley and Florenz Plassmann ()
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]

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Abstract: We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to address the question of what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Unlike previous analyses, we consider only those voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners, because these are the cases where the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules. After assessing the theoretical as well as the empirical Condorcet Efficiencies, we find that, despite considerable differences between the properties of the theoretical framework and the characteristics of three sets of empirical ranking data, all four analyses suggest that there is a considerable benefit in asking voters to submit candidate rankings.

Keywords: Economic Theory; Game Theory; Economics; Social and Behav. Sciences; Game Theory/Mathematical Methods; Political Economy; Public Finance & Economics; Revue AERES; Social Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, pp.1--41. ⟨10.1007/s00355-015-0920-5⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243409

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0920-5

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