Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 6 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 199-247 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The primary objective of this chapter is to evaluate the impact that the presence of various degrees of measures of group mutual coherence have on the Condorcet Efficiency of voting rules. The Efficiency Hypothesis suggests that the Condorcet Efficiency of voting rules should increase as voters’ preferences reflect increased levels of group mutual coherence. Some preliminary work has been conducted in this area, when attention is primarily focused on group mutual coherence, as measured by the proximity of voting situations to the condition of perfectly single-peaked preferences.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Preference Ranking; Weak Measure; Rule Elimination; Strong Measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_6

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