Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer, currently edited by Marc Fleurbaey and Maurice Salles

Date: 2011
ISBN: 978-3-642-03107-6
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 9 Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 1 Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 2 Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 3 Other Incompatibility Paradoxes

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 4 Other Voting Paradoxes

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 5 Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 6 Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 7 Other Characteristics of Voting Rules

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

Ch Chapter 8 The Significance of Voting Rule Selection

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6

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