Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter 9 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 331-366 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Borda Compromise gives a good foundation for determining how an election should be held when the objective is to determine only a winning candidate and nothing is known a priori about the basic model that describes how voters’ form their preferences on candidates. When the objective is to maximize the probability that the PMRW is elected, BR can be expected to perform well, while minimizing the risk that very poor performance might be observed, which can happen with the other common voting rules. Our attention now turns to considering the effectiveness of voting rules at matching the complete PMR ranking on candidates. Some attention will also be given to the evaluation of voting rules on their ability to select a committee, rather than simply select a single winner.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Proportional Representation; Preference Ranking; Weak Measure; Prefer Candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_9

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