Voting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 1 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 1-47 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An extraordinary amount of research effort has been dedicated to the application of formal mathematical modeling techniques to the analysis of the question: “How should a group of individual decision-makers go about the process of selecting some alternative that can be viewed as being the best among a set of available alternatives?” Any group decision-making situation of this type can be viewed in the context of an election in which the available alternatives correspond to the candidates in the election, and where the alternative that is selected as the overall best corresponds to the winning candidate in the election. The individual decision-makers within the group are consequently acting as the voters in the election scenario.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Preference Ranking; Prefer Candidate; Individual Voter; Vote Situation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_1

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642031076

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_1

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().