Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 2 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 49-79 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The possibility that various election paradoxes might exist has been seen to be a potentially significant threat to the stability of election processes, and we have developed a number of different mathematical models that can be used to assess the likelihood that these paradoxes might actually be observed. These basic models have been used to yield some support to the intuitively appealing hypothesis that the likelihood that these voting paradoxes will be observed should tend to decrease with increasing levels of social homogeneity among the preferences of voters in the population, or as the degree of dependence among voters’ preferences in the population tends to increase. There is a direct linkage between increases in the measure of dependence among voters’ preferences and the degree of social homogeneity that is expected to exist in a voting situation.

Keywords: Group Coherence; Preference Ranking; Weak Measure; Prefer Candidate; Strong Measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_2

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