Other Voting Paradoxes

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 4 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 123-155 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Choice Set Variance Paradoxes were introduced in Chap. 1 , where they were defined as representing situations in which a series of issues are to be put before voters, such that each individual issue will be approved or disapproved by majority rule voting.

Keywords: Majority Rule; Vote Rule; Correlation Term; Majority Party; Issue Position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_4

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