The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule

William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]

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Abstract: When voters' preferences on candidates are mutually coherent, in the sense that they are at all close to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed, or perfectly polarized, there is a large probability that a Condorcet Winner exists in elections with a small number of candidates. Given this fact, the study develops representations for Condorcet Efficiency of plurality rule as a function of the proximity of voters' preferences on candidates to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed or perfectly polarized. We find that the widely used plurality rule has Condorcet Efficiency values that behave in very different ways under each of these three models of mutual coherence.

Keywords: Condorcet efficieny; D7; Economic Theory; Game Theory; Economics; Social and Behav. Sciences; Game Theory/Mathematical Methods; Methodology of the Social Sciences; Operations Research/Decision Theory; Revue AERES; single-peaked preferences; voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Published in Theory and Decision, 2008, 67 (3), pp.267--293. ⟨10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z⟩

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Journal Article: The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01243483

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z

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