Strategic Manipulation in Committees Using the Plurality Rule: Alternative Concepts and Frequency Calculations

Dominique Lepelley and Boniface Mbih

Group Decision and Negotiation, 1997, vol. 6, issue 2, No 1, 119-138

Abstract: Abstract This paper suggests an evaluation of the plurality rule according to how much it can be manipulated by individuals. We analyze strategic voting with reference not only to the usual notion of Nash equilibrium but also to some weaknesses of this notion, depending on the assumptions about how the individual agents choose their strategies. We provide two types of results for each concept of equilibrium: First, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a profile to be an equilibrium when the plurality rule is used; and second, we present formulas giving the exact frequencies of unstable situations in the three-alternative case.

Keywords: manipulation; plurality rule; equilibria and quasi-equilibria; unstable voting situations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1008623627332 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:6:y:1997:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1008623627332

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1008623627332

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().