Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case

Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin (), Jean-Louis Rouet () and Laurent Vidu
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Jean-Louis Rouet: ISTO - Institut des Sciences de la Terre d'Orléans - UMR7327 - BRGM - Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières - OSUC - Observatoire des Sciences de l'Univers en région Centre - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - Observatoire de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - UO - Université d'Orléans - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Laurent Vidu: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In a federal union, a referendum paradox occurs each time a decision taken by representatives elected in separate jurisdictions (districts, states, regions) conflicts with the decision that would have been adopted if the voters had directly given their opinion via a referendum (Nurmi 1999). Assuming that the population is split into three jurisdictions of respective size n1, n2 and n3, we derive exact formulas for the probability of the referendum paradox under the Impartial Culture model. Then we use these results to show that, in our model, allocating seats to the juridictions proportionally to the square root of their size is an apportionment rule that fails to minimize the probability of the referendum paradox in some federations.

Keywords: federalism; indirect voting; apportionment; paradoxes; probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2014, 34 (4), pp.2201-2207

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Journal Article: Referendum paradox in a federal union with unequal populations: the three state case (2014)
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