Voting rules manipulability and social homogeneity

Dominique Lepelley and Fabrice Valognes ()
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Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Voting rules manipulability; social homogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Published in Public Choice, 2003, 116, pp.165-184

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Journal Article: Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00069239

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