Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective

Olivier de Mouzon (), Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton () and Dominique Lepelley
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Olivier de Mouzon: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Thibault Laurent: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Michel Le Breton: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate compacts that are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case, the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner, while in the other case it allocates the votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. Decisiveness and welfare analyses are conducted with a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College wherein malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations.

Keywords: electoral college; voting power; interstate compact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Public Choice, 2019, 179 (1-2), pp.51-95. ⟨10.1007/s11127-018-0576-7⟩

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Journal Article: Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02097201

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0576-7

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