Coalitional manipulability of three scale evaluative voting: Quantification and comparison with three other voting rules

Manipulabilité coalitionnelle du vote par note à trois niveaux: Quantification et comparaison à trois autres règles de vote

Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Dominique Lepelley, Jérôme Serais () and Hatem Smaoui ()
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Abdelhalim El Ouafdi: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion
Jérôme Serais: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion

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Abstract: All non dictatorial voting rules are susceptible to be manipulated by a group of agents; however, some voting rules are more vulnerable to strategic manipulation than others. The vulnerability of a voting rule to manipulation can be evaluated by the frequency of unstable voting situations where manipulation is possible. We evaluate in this paper the vulnerability of Evaluative Voting (2,1,0) – EV in what follows – to strategic manipulation by coalitions of voters when voter preferences are trichotomous and three candidates are in contention. In order to compare the performance of EV to the ones of plurality rule, antiplurality (or negative plurality) rule and Borda rule, we also compute the theoretical frequency of unstable voting situations for each of these three voting rules when they are extended to the trichotomous framework.

Keywords: Evaluative voting; Impartial anonymous culture; Strategic manipulation; Voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04-22
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2021, 132 (2), pp.297-321. ⟨10.3917/redp.312.0129⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03250076

DOI: 10.3917/redp.312.0129

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