Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules

Dominique Lepelley and Hatem Smaoui ()
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Hatem Smaoui: Université de La Réunion

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, vol. 28, issue 4, No 5, 787-804

Abstract: Abstract We compare in this paper two classes of sequential scoring rules: the first class eliminates at each step the candidate with the lowest score whereas the second one eliminates the candidates whose scores are equal to or lower than the average score of the candidates remaining in contention. We show that, in three-candidate elections, the second method is susceptible to improve the ability of the sequential scoring rules to avoid monotonicity paradoxes, but this benefit is offset by a decrease in the Condorcet efficiency of these rules.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Monotonicity paradoxes; Condorcet efficiency; Nanson elimination rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09618-5

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