On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences

Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Dominique Lepelley and Hatem Smaoui ()
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Abdelhalim El Ouafdi: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion

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Abstract: We investigate the propensity of evaluative voting (2, 1, 0) to fulfill Condorcet majority conditions in a framework where preferences are supposed to be trichotomous and only three candidates are in contention. In this framework, we also compare evaluative voting to other voting rules, including Borda rule, plurality rule and approval voting.

Keywords: Voting by evaluation; Three-valued scale; Approval voting; Scoring rules; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2020, 289 (2), pp.227-241. ⟨10.1007/s10479-020-03591-y⟩

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Journal Article: On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03543401

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03591-y

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