On the Kim and Roush Voting Procedure

Dominique Lepelley and Fabrice Valognes
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Fabrice Valognes: /C.R.E.M.E., Université de Caen

Group Decision and Negotiation, 1999, vol. 8, issue 2, No 2, 109-123

Abstract: Abstract We study in this paper some features of a new voting rule recently proposed by K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush. The (conjectural) optimality of this voting rule with respect to statistical manipulability by coalitions is discussed under two alternative probabilistic assumptions, namely the impartial culture condition (IC) and the impartial anonymous culture condition (IAC). We also analyze the ability of Kim and Roush procedure to fulfil the Condorcet conditions. Some representations of its Condorcet efficiency in three-alternative elections are obtained.

Keywords: social choice; voting rules; manipulability; condorcet efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008610701801

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