Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley and Florenz Plassmann
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware [Newark]
Florenz Plassmann: Binghamton University [SUNY] - SUNY - State University of New York

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.

Keywords: Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Group Decision and Negotiation, 2016, 25 (5), pp.941--966. ⟨10.1007/s10726-016-9470-1⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01452552

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9470-1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().