La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale

Virginie Béhue, Pierre Favardin and Dominique Lepelley

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2009, vol. 75, issue 4, 503-516

Abstract: Theoretical analysis of the voting rules susceptibility to strategic manipulation suggests that the choice of the best rule (the less vulnerable to manipulation) is closely related to the underlying notion of equilibrium that is used. A crucial question is to know whether or not the possibility of reacting to a threat of manipulation should be taken in consideration. We investigate this question using laboratory experiments. We find empirical support for the specific notion of reaction. JEL code: C9, D72.

Keywords: social choice; voting rules; strategic manipulation; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale (2010)
Working Paper: La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote: une étude expérimentale (2009)
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