Computer simulations of voting systems

Dominique Lepelley, Ahmed Louichi () and Fabrice Valognes ()
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Ahmed Louichi: GEMMA-CREME, Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen, 14032 Caen Cedex, France
Fabrice Valognes: Université Notre Dame de Namur, Belgique

Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), 2000, vol. 03, issue 01n04, 181-194

Abstract: All voting procedures are susceptible to give rise, if not to paradoxes, at least to violations of some democratic principles. In this paper, we evaluate and compare the propensity of various voting rules -belonging to the class of scoring rules- to satisfy two versions of the majority principle. We consider the asymptotic case where the numbers of voters tends to infinity and, for each rule, we study with the help of Monte Carlo methods how this propensity varies as a function of the number of candidates.

Keywords: Voting; Condorcet Efficiency; Majority Principle; Scoring Rules; Simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:03:y:2000:i:01n04:n:s0219525900000145

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219525900000145

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