Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2004, issue 75-76, 331-351

Abstract: We analyze a centralized system as one in which a political authority finances by general taxation two local public goods each one associated with a particular region. Because individuals in the two regions have different preferences, they engage in rent-seeking activities to influence centralized policy-making in their preferred direction. Several results emerge from the analysis and in particular rent-seeking is shown to be increasing in taste heterogeneity and in the degree of spillovers.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:75-76:p:331-351

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