Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1

Abstract: We analyze a centralized system as one in which a political authority finances by general taxation two local public goods each one associated with a particular region. Because individuals in the two regions have different preferences, they engage in rent-seeking activities to influence centralized policy-making in their preferred direction. Several results emerge from the analysis and in particular rent-seeking is shown to be increasing in taste heterogeneity and in the degree of spillovers.

Keywords: (LOCAL) PUBLIC GOODS; RENT-SEEKING; GENERAL TAXATION; SPILLOVERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2004.12

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