Critères d'attribution des allocations chômage et performances du marché du travail

Gilles Joseph ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2005, issue 78, 117-141

Abstract: We study the effects of attribution criteria of unemployment benefits in an equilibrium model of unemployment where search intensities and wages are endogenous. Taking full account of an eligibility condition requiring a given work duration in order to benefit from unemployment insurance allow us to qualify the role of wages in the definition of the optimal sequence of unemployment benefits. At a given tax rate, numerical exercises suggest that the fall of the ineligible employees' wages contribute to the efficiency of a declining sequence of unemployment benefits. It is also shown that a stricter eligibility requirement could enhance the employment rate and the welfare of all workers when wages are negotiated. Finally, for the same unemployment rate, the optimal profile setting of unemployment benefits implies that wage flexibility is associated to an utilitarian welfare criterion, whereas wage rigidity is more convenient for a rawlsian one.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Critères d’attribution des allocations chômage et performances du marché du travail (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2005:i:78:p:117-141

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