Maisons de disques et artistes: convergence ou conflit d'intérêts face au numérique ?
Nicolas Curien and
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2009, issue 93-94, 183-205
We model the relationship between an artist and a record company as a revenue-sharing game that stems from two complementary markets: the recorded-music market and the live-music market. Artists are heterogeneous according to their potential success as well as to the amount that live music represents in their total revenues. The model shows that: (i) the bargaining power between a record company and an artist will partially switch from the former to the latter because of the increasing value of an artist's outside options; (ii) digitization should favor the live-music market and thus mitigate the negative impact of piracy, or even reverse it for artists with a strong activity on stage; (iii) the rise of new contracts is an opportunity for both record companies and artists. Getting a share of live music revenues could make a record company profitable unlike standard contracts. Sharing their live music revenues could be a condition for some artists to release an album.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:183-205
Access Statistics for this article
Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer
More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().