No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas

Boniface Mbih and Xingyu Zhao

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2011, issue 101-102, 127-147

Abstract: It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of « no-show paradox ». This paper is devoted to the evaluation of the likelihood of that phenomenon under parliamentary voting rules.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas (2011)
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