No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas

Boniface Mbih and Xingyu Zhao
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Xingyu Zhao: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of no-show paradox. This paper is devoted to the evalution of the likelihood of that phenomenon under parliamentary voting rules.

Keywords: alpha-majority; No-Show; Parliamentary Agendas; Impartial Anonymous Culture; alpha-majority. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
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Published in Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2011, 101/102, pp.127-147

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00656614

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