Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Natacha Raffin

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2014, issue 115-116, 379-407

Abstract: We develop a political economy model that might explain discrepancies in environmental performance, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. They also vote on a tax that will be exclusively used to finance environmental protection. We show that the model may generate multiple equilibria and agents' expectations may be self-fulfilling when the public policy is endogenous. Then, we analyse the long-term implications of a public policy that would favour education and make it possible to select the higher equilibrium.

Date: 2014
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.379 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2014)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2014:i:115-116:p:379-407

DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.115-116.379

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