Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection
Natacha Raffin ()
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
We develop a political economy model that might explain the different environmental performance of countries, through educational choices. Individuals decide whether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. They also vote on a tax that will be exclusively used to finance environmental protection. We show that the model may generate multiple equilibria and agents' expectations may be self-fulfilling when the public policy is endogenous. Then, we analyse the long-term implications of a public policy that would favour education and make it possible to select the higher equilibrium.
Keywords: Environmental quality; human capital; education; self-fulfilling prophecies; public policy.; Qualité environnementale; capital humain; prophéties auto-réalisatrices; politique publique. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in 2010
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Journal Article: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2014)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2014)
Working Paper: Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00492178
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