Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

Jeffrey Carpenter, Peter Matthews and John Schirm ()

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 1, 504-17

Abstract: Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)

JEL-codes: D82 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.504
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (148)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment (2007)
Working Paper: TOURNAMENTS AND OFFICE POLITICS: Evidence from a real effort experiment (2007)
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