Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments

Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gächter

American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 1, 541-56

Abstract: One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish. (D12, D 83, H41, Z13)

JEL-codes: D12 D83 H41 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.541
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (875)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments (2009)
Working Paper: Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments (2008)
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