Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment

Christoph Brunner, Colin Camerer () and Jacob Goeree

American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101, issue 2, 1029-40

Abstract: Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

Date: 2011
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