Rock and Roll Bands, (In)complete Contracts, and Creativity

Cedric Ceulemans, Victor Ginsburgh and Patrick Legros

American Economic Review, 2011, vol. 101, issue 3, 217-21

Abstract: Members of a rock and roll band are endowed with different amounts of creativity. They match, compose songs, and share credit. The presence of more creative members increases the probability of success, but those more creative members may also claim a larger share of the pie. In our theoretical model, the nature of matching as well as the covariation between the probability of success and the allocation of credit among individual members are a function of the completeness of contracting. The data show that rock bands tend to enter into incomplete contracts and positive assortative matching.

Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Rock and roll bands, (in)complete contracts, and creativity (2011)
Working Paper: Rock and roll bands, (in)complete contracts and creativity (2010)
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