Rock and roll bands, (in)complete contracts and creativity

Cédric Ceulemans, Victor Ginsburgh and Patrick Legros
Additional contact information
Cédric Ceulemans: Université Libre de Bruxelles, ECARES, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium

No 2010074, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Members of a rock and roll band are endowed with different creativity. They match and eventually obtain credit for song writing as well as a share of the returns from sales. More creative members increase the probability of success but may also claim a larger share of the pie. In our theoretical model, the nature of matching (postive or negative assortative) as well as the covariation between the probability of having a “hit” and the dispersion of credits given to individual members are a function of the completeness of contracting. When members adopt a “gentleman’s agreement” to share credits equally, the covariation between the probability of a hit and the dispersion of credits is negative, which is the consequence of positive assortative matching in creativity. The data show that the relation between dispersion and success is significantly negative, and that rock bands are thus likely to sign incomplete contracts.

Keywords: overlapping generations; resource management; common pool resource; spatial interdependence; strategic behaviour; cooperative behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 K11 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rock and Roll Bands, (In)complete Contracts, and Creativity (2011)
Working Paper: Rock and roll bands, (in)complete contracts, and creativity (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010074

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