The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

Eric Budish and Estelle Cantillon

American Economic Review, 2012, vol. 102, issue 5, 2237-71

Abstract: We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82, I23)

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (107)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.5.2237 (application/pdf)
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/aug2012/20091443_data.zip dataset accompanying article (application/zip)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2010)
Working Paper: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:5:p:2237-71

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().