The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

Estelle Cantillon and Eric Budish

No 7641, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause meaningful welfare losses. However, we also find that ex-ante welfare is higher than under the strategyproof and ex-post efficient alternative, the Random Serial Dictatorship. We trace the poor ex-ante performance of RSD to a phenomenon specific to multi-unit assignment, "callousness". We draw lessons for the design of multi-unit assignment mechanisms and for market design more broadly.

Keywords: Course allocation; Dictatorship; Market design; Multi-unit assignment; Random serial dictatorship; Ex-ante efficiency; Ex-post efficiency; Strategyproofness; Strategic behaviour; Field data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C93 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2012)
Working Paper: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard (2009)
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