Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments

J. Michelle Brock, Andreas Lange and Erkut Ozbay

American Economic Review, 2013, vol. 103, issue 1, 415-37

Abstract: We study if and how social preferences extend to risky environments. We provide experimental evidence from different versions of dictator games with risky outcomes and establish that preferences that are exclusively based on ex post or on ex ante comparisons cannot generate the observed behavioral patterns. The more money decision-makers transfer in the standard dictator game, the more likely they are to equalize payoff chances under risk. Risk to the recipient does, however, generally decrease the transferred amount. Ultimately, a utility function with a combination of ex post and ex ante fairness concerns may best describe behavior. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

JEL-codes: C72 D63 D64 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.415
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (199)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.103.1.415 (application/pdf)
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/feb2013/20100497_data.zip (application/zip)
https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/feb2013/20100497_app.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:103:y:2013:i:1:p:415-37

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Review is currently edited by Esther Duflo

More articles in American Economic Review from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().