Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Eduardo Perez

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 5, 469-74

Abstract: This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.469
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

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Working Paper: Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps (2015)
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