Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Eduardo Perez

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Abstract: This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.

Date: 2015-05
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Published in American Economic Review, 2015, 104 (5), pp.469 - 474. ⟨10.1257/aer.104.5.469⟩

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Journal Article: Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03392982

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.469

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